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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Changing Marital Relationship, Private Ordering, and Marital Contracts
In the last twenty years many changes have occurred in the institution of
marriage. Divorce has become commonplace,' the rate of remarriage has increased
along with the rate of divorce, 2 and traditional marriage roles have been redefined.3
Married, single, and divorced women are now more economically independent due
to greater job opportunities and increasing employment of women.4 No-fault divorce
statutes and recent United States Supreme Court cases5 promoting private ordering of
the marital relationship have also weakened the states' role in regulating marriage.
The changes in the marital relationship have caused some states to reverse prior
law and validate antenuptial agreements. 6 An antenuptial, or prenuptial, agreement is
a contract entered into by a couple in contemplation of marriage in which the property
rights and economic interests of either the prospective wife, or husband, or both, are
determined and set forth.7 The partners agree upon the distribution of each spouse's
assets and spousal support payments in the event of divorce.
The typical antenuptial contract is made by those marrying later in life or by
those who have been previously married and have children from the prior mar-
riage(s). 8 These individuals often have had time to collect assets which they want to
pass on to their children or to other specific persons. As the divorce and remarriage
rates climb, there are increasing numbers of couples with these concerns. Thus, the
1. The most recent U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services statistics show that from 1965 to 1979 the rate of
divorce increased from 2.5 to 5.4 people per 1,000 of total population, representing an increase from 479,000 to
1,181,000 divorces per year. VrrA STATIsncs OF THE UNrrE) STATiS 1979, Vol. II-MARGE AND DIVORCE, Table 2-1, p.
2-5 (1984).
2. Compare Vrrss STAs=cs or THE UNmED STATES 1969, Vol. llm-MARwucE AND DIVORCE, Table 1-10, p. 1-10
(1972) with VrrA. STATIncs or THE U'm STATrs 1979, Vol. III-MARRIAGE AxD DIVORCE, Table 1-10, p. 1-11 (1984)
(showing that from 1969 to 1979 the rate of remarriages increased from 17.6% to 25.3% for women and from 18.5% to
27.3% for men). See also VrrAL STATISTICS oF mE UNrIED STArs 1966, Vol. III-MURIAGE AND DIVORCE, Table 1-10 (1969).
3. L. Wr-c.t , THE MAR AFE Co.-RAcr 168 (1981).
4. In 1950, 42.8% of women over 16 worked outside the home compared to 61.4% in 1980. 1980 CEssus or mm
POFPUIATo,, Vol. 1. Ch. C, Part 1, Fig. 18, p. 1-10m (1983).
5. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state has limited control over the type of birth control used
by spouses); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (husband and wife may have an equal duty of support).
6. Those states validating antenuptial agreements with provisions for divorce include: Arkansas, LeFevers v.
LeFevers, 240 Ark. 992, 403 S.W.2d 65 (1966); Colorado, Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982);
Connecticut, Pamiawski v. Pamiawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Florida, Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d
381 (Fla. 1970); Illinois, Volid v. Volid, 6 IIU. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972); Nevada, Buettner v. Buettner, 89
Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Ohio, Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984); Oklahoma, Hudson
v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960); and Oregon, Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
7. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 102, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (1984). Antenuptial agreements providing for
child custody or visitation have not been enforced because the states believe they have a responsibility to form judicial
decrees which will protect the best interests of the children of divorce. See Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.05 (Page 1980
& Supp. 1984).
8. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 141 (1979); Moore, The Enforceability of Premarital
Agreements Contingent upon Divorce, 10 Omo N.U.L. REV. 11 (1983).
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use of antenuptial contracts has increased and represents an efficient way for these
couples to order their relationships privately. 9
Most states have long allowed premarital agreements which regulate the
devolution of property at the death of one spouse as long as a disclosure of assets was
made at the execution of the contract and no coercion was involved.' 0 Courts have
said that premarital agreements containing provisions for property division at death
promote marital tranquility."I By contrast, the prevailing law in the United States on
antenuptial agreements regulating property division and spousal support payments
upon divorce has been that these agreements are void as against public policy.' 2
Public policy reasons for invalidating these agreements have included: (1) the
agreements tend to encourage divorce; (2) the contracts tend to commercialize
marriage; (3) the agreements may result in economically dependent spouses becom-
ing dependent upon the state for support; (4) the contracts are inconsistent with the
husband's duty to support his wife; (5) the contracts are unfair because of the
husband's greater knowledge of business and his dominance over the wife; and (6) the
contracts are unfair because of the long interval between the contract's formation and
the end of the marriage.' 3 However, because social changes such as women's
increased independence and the public's acceptance of divorce have negated many of
these problems, courts are beginning to view antenuptial agreements with divorce
provisions positively-as promoting marriages later in life and second marriages.14
B. The New Ohio Supreme Court Requirements
In 1984 the Ohio Supreme Court was faced for the first time with the issue of
the validity of an antenuptial agreement providing for divorce in Gross v. Gross.'5
The court had previously validated antenuptial agreements providing for the
devolution of property on one spouse's death. 16 However, lower Ohio courts had
reached varying results with respect to antenuptial agreements with divorce provi-
sions. 17
Like other states' courts that have recently validated antenuptial agreements with
provisions for divorce, the Ohio Supreme Court in Gross believed changes "in the
attitudes and mores surrounding marriage" mandated that these agreements be
9. See Clark, supra note 8; Moore, supra note 8.
10. See Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo. 206, 209, 193 P. 550, 551 (1920); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143
So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962); Wetsel v. Firebaugh, 258 11. 404, 407, 101 N.E. 602, 604 (1913); In re Muxlow's Estate,
367 Mich. 133, 137, 116 N.W.2d 43, 45 (1962).
11. Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 649 (1846).
12. See Moore, supra note 8, at 12.
13. Id. at 12-18.
14. See LeFevers v. LeFevers, 240 Ark. 992, 993, 403 S.W.2d 65, 66 (1966); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d
728, 732 (Colo. 1982); Pamiawski v. Pamiawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 46-47, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (1976); Posner v.
Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 6 111. App. 3d 386, 390, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972); Buettner
v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45, 505 P.2d 600, 603-04 (1973); Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500,
506 (1984); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
15. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984).
16. Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
17. Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64 (Ct. App. 1983); Benza v. Benza, No. 171, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29,
1978); Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio App. 399
(1919).
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validated. 18 The court in Gross listed these changes as the greater frequency of
divorce and remarriage, the percentage drop in marriage among our citizens
(indicating that the court thought antenuptial contracts would promote marriage), the
adoption by a number of states of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act19 (which
allows courts to consider premarital agreements in framing a divorce decree), and
most significantly, the widespread adoption of no-fault divorce laws. 20 Ohio Revised
Code section 3105.63,21 which allows divorcing spouses to draft their own separation
agreement, indicated that Ohio should accept antenuptial agreements which have the
same purpose. Finally, the court stated that "these changes have altered the public
policy view toward antenuptial agreements made in contemplation of a possible
divorce."22
In light of changing public attitudes and to eliminate the conflict among the
lower Ohio courts, the Ohio Supreme Court in Gross resolved three major issues
involved in antenuptial contracts with provisions for divorce. First, the court held that
because of the changing attitudes on marriage, antenuptial agreements "containing
provisions for the disposition of property and setting forth amounts to be paid as
sustenance alimony" on divorce are not contrary to public policy. 23 The court set
forth three requirements for valid and enforceable antenuptial agreements: (1) they
must be "entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching"; (2)
there must have been "a full disclosure or full knowledge, and understanding, of the
nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse's property"; and (3) the terms must
not "promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce." 24 Second, the court
held that these agreements may be enforced by the party at fault in the divorce in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary. 25 Last, the court held that although
a court cannot modify property allocation provisions in these agreements at the time
of divorce, the trial court can modify the alimony provisions if the provisions are
unconscionable at the time of divorce because of changed circumstances.2 6
In resolving these issues, the Ohio Supreme Court referred to recent cases from
other jurisdictions which had considered them. 27 These courts used family law and
contract law principles to resolve the issues presented in the cases before them. Many
courts have applied these principles selectively according to the holding they wished
to achieve. 28
After referring to cases from other jurisdictions, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Gross also applied contract law and family law principles to produce a test for
18. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 104, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1984).
19. UNwp-o l MaARmF AmN DrVoRcE Act § 306, 9A U.L.A. 218 (1979).
20. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 104, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1984).
21. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
22. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 104, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1984).
23. Id. at 105, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 108, 464 N.E.2d at 508.
26. Id. at 109, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
27. Id. at 104-05, 464 N.E.2d at 505-06. In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court in Gross relied on Newman v.
Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982) and Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
28. See L. WEnz w, supra note 3, at 340-41.
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validating antenuptial agreements providing for divorce. According to the court in
Gross, a valid antenuptial agreement must comply with the contract law29 require-
ments of disclosure and lack of fraud, duress, coercion, and overreaching. The court
reaffirmed a traditional family law policy reason3o for not enforcing antenuptial
agreements by requiring that the agreement must not promote or encourage divorce
or profiteering by divorce. The court also applied the family law concept of "changed
circumstances," long used by family courts as a reason to modify alimony and child
support decrees31 and to invalidate and modify sustenance alimony provisions in
antenuptial agreements. In Gross the Ohio Supreme Court merged these contract and
family law principles to form a three-part test and a guideline for the modification of
spousal support provisions.
C. Scope
This Comment will discuss the problems associated with applying family law
and contract law principles to validate antenuptial agreements with provisions for
divorce. It will assert that new rules must be established to replace some of these
principles because the purposes and policies underlying antenuptial agreements are
different from those associated with a commercial contract and from a judicial decree
or a separation agreement formed at the time of divorce. The disclosure and lack of
fraud and coercion requirements will be discussed, along with the problems involved
in requiring that the agreement must not promote divorce or profit from divorce. The
"changed circumstances" test for invalidating sustenance alimony provisions at
divorce will also be critiqued and compared with more appropriate reasons for
modification used by other jurisdictions. Finally, this Comment will assert that courts
should be able to modify unconscionable property division provisions in the same
way they modify unconscionable sustenance alimony provisions.
I. OHIO'S EARLIER CASE LAW
Before discussing the decision in Gross, it is necessary to understand the case
law that helped shape the Ohio Supreme Court's holding. Although the Ohio
Supreme Court had never reviewed an antenuptial agreement with provisions for
divorce before Gross, several Ohio lower courts had ruled on the validity of these
agreements. 32
The Ohio Supreme Court has reviewed antenuptial agreements providing for
property division at death several times in the past.33 The court first validated this
29. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984). The court stated that these terms would be applied to
antenuptial agreements by using their "generally accepted meaning." Id. Since these terms have usually been used to
review commercial contracts, their generally accepted meaning is that used in commercial contract law.
30. See supra text accompanying note 13.
31. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.18, 3109.05 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
32. Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Benza v. Benza, No. 171, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
29, 1978); Dearbaugh v. Dearbaugh, 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 11 Ohio App.
399 (1919).
33. Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 148 Ohio St. 149, 74 N.E.2d 67 (1947); Juhasz v. Juhasz,
134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
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type of agreement in 1846 in Stilley v. Folger,34 declaring that public policy favored
antenuptial agreements which provide for the enjoyment of property during marriage
or at the death of one of the spouses, because these agreements tend to promote
domestic happiness by removing a frequent cause of family disputes. 35 The court held
that this type of contract was enforceable if it was bona fide and contained reasonable
provisions for the wife. 36 A major factor in the court's decision to validate the
agreement in Stilley was that the agreement barred the wife's dower right, and the
decision to forego a dower interest had been previously allowed in Ohio through a
different process. 37
In 1938, the Ohio Supreme Court established guidelines in Juhasz v. Juhasz38 to
determine the enforceability of antenuptial agreements with provisions for property
division at death. The wife of the decedent in Juhasz claimed that she was not bound
by a prenuptial agreement providing for property division at the death of her spouse. 39
The court first stated that an agreement to marry gives rise to a confidential
relationship between the contracting parties. 4o The court also held that an antenuptial
contract entered into during engagement is valid when the provision reflects a
voluntary, intelligent, and knowing decision by the aggrieved spouse. 41 The court
held that when the amount provided for the surviving spouse is disproportionate to the
decedent spouse's estate and to the amount the surviving spouse would take at law,
the burden is on those claiming the validity of the contract to show that the decedent
spouse made a full disclosure to the surviving spouse of "the nature, extent and value
of the intended husband's property" or that the surviving spouse "had full knowledge
thereof without such disclosure.' 42 The court also held that if the surviving spouse
had had full knowledge of the assets or if full disclosure had been made and the
surviving spouse voluntarily had entered into the contract, the surviving spouse
would be bound by the agreement. 43 Using these guidelines, the court ruled in Juhasz
that the wife was bound by the agreement. 44
The 1982 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Hook v. Hook,45 a case involving
facts similar to those in Juhasz, reaffirmed the Juhasz guidelines for determining the
enforceability of antenuptial agreements with provisions for property division at
34. 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
35. Id. at 649.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 650. A wife was permitted to forego her dower interest voluntarily through a process called jointure. An
early Ohio statute, Swans Statutes 296, § 2 (1824), provided for and described the process ofjointure: "If any estate shall
be conveyed to a woman as jointure, to take effect immediately after the death of her husband, and to continue during
her life; such conveyance shall bar her right to dower." The court said the antenuptial agreement became an equitable
jointure under Swans Statutes 198, § 2 (1824). Id.
38. 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938).
39. Id. at 268, 16 N.E.2d at 333.
40. Id. at 264, 16 N.E.2d at 331.
41. See id. at 264-65, 16 N.E.2d at 331.
42. Id. at 264, 16 N.E.2d at 331.
43. Id. at 264-65, 16 N.E.2d at 331.
44. Id. at 269-70, 16 N.E.2d at 333-34. While the court applied the guidelines discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 41-43, the court decided against the wife because the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 270,
16 N.E.2d at 334.
45. 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 431 N.E.2d 667 (1982).
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death. In Hook the court ruled that a surviving spouse is bound by a disproportionate
distribution of the estate at the death of the other spouse if the surviving spouse had
voluntarily entered, after full disclosure, into an antenuptial agreement providing for
this disproportionate amount.46
In Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart,47 decided in 1947, a
couple had drafted an antenuptial agreement which granted the wife support payments
after the husband's death.4 8 The husband divorced the wife for gross neglect of
duty. 49 Two years after the divorce the ex-husband died.50 Although they had
divorced, the ex-wife attempted to enforce the agreement. 5 1 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that the marriage had been the consideration for, and thus a term of, the
agreement, and had been breached by the wife's aggression. Therefore, the court held
that the agreement was void.52 Although the court was ruling on an antenuptial
agreement providing for property division at death, the court's position was that when
a marriage ended by divorce an antenuptial agreement would no longer be valid due
to the lack of consideration.5 3
Ohio's lower courts had also reviewed antenuptial agreements with property
division and sustenance alimony provisions for divorce in several cases prior to the
Ohio Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Gross. As in Burkhart, most of these lower
courts considering a prenuptial contract with divorce provisions invalidated the
agreement at issue because of the enforcing party's wrongdoing that caused the
divorce. The first Ohio case to make this ruling, Kennedy v. Kennedy, 54 decided in
1919, was also the first reported case in Ohio to consider the validity of an antenuptial
agreement which takes effect upon divorce. In Kennedy the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County held that the husband's gross neglect of duty that caused the
divorce also constituted a breach of the antenuptial agreement.5 5 Therefore, the wife
was allowed to rescind the agreement.5 6
Forty years later, the Court of Appeals for Shelby County in Dearbaugh v.
Dearbaugh57 also ruled that a prenuptial agreement cannot be enforced by the spouse
whose wrongdoing caused the divorce. In Dearbaugh the court would not allow the
husband to enforce an antenuptial agreement at divorce because the wife had been
granted a divorce on the ground of the husband's extreme cruelty. 58
Thus, the courts in Dearbaugh, Kennedy, and Burkhart based their invalidation
of agreements on the theory that marriage itself is the consideration for, and thus a
term of, the antenuptial contract. In these cases when one party caused the marriage
46. Id. at 236, 431 N.E.2d at 669.
47. 148 Ohio St. 149, 74 N.E.2d 67 (1947).
48. Id. at 149, 74 N.E.2d at 67.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 152-53, 74 N.E.2d at 68-69.
53. Id. at 151-52, 74 N.E.2d at 68.
54. 11 Ohio App. 399 (1919).
55. Id. at 401.
56. Id. at 402.
57. 110 Ohio App. 540, 170 N.E.2d 262 (1959).
58. Id. at 542, 170 N.E.2d at 263.
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to terminate through that party's own wrongdoing, that party could no longer enforce
the agreement.
One recent unreported Ohio case, however, used a different method to determine
the enforceability of antenuptial agreements. In Benza v. Benza59 the Court of
Appeals for Warren County examined the intent of the parties at the time of the
execution of the agreement to determine enforceability and rejected the rationale used
in Dearbaugh, Kennedy, and Burkhart. The court in Benza was not ruling on the
validity of the contract, because the contract had been determined to be valid and
binding in a previous action from which no appeal had been taken.60 However, in
dicta the Benza court stated that the antenuptial agreement in that case should be
enforced because "when considered from its four comers, the antenuptial agreement
is so comprehensive as to include a waiver of any right to alimony by the parties
thereto."61
Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Gross, the Benza holding
represented a minority view. Most of the lower Ohio courts followed the Burkhart
rule and would not allow the party at fault in a divorce to enforce an antenuptial
agreement. Because no-fault divorce has only recently been enacted in Ohio,62 the
majority rule meant that at least one spouse, the spouse at fault, could not enforce the
agreement.
1I. GROSS v. GROSS
A. The Trial Court Decision
The trial court in Gross, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division
of Domestic Relations, relying on Benza,63 held that the parties had intended through
their antenuptial agreement to set forth the property and support rights of each spouse
upon divorce. 64 Gross involved a typical antenuptial agreement because both spouses
had been previously married and Mr. Gross attempted through the agreement to
preserve his assets for his sons from a prior marriage. 65 The trial court incorporated
the divorce provisions in the Grosses' antenuptial agreement into the divorce
decree. 66 The agreement contained the following property division and support
provisions: (1) that the wife would be entitled to a maximum of $200 per month
sustenance alimony if the court decided to grant her alimony; (2) that she would not
receive any of her husband's property on divorce except for one-half the equity in the
marital residence; (3) that the wife would be entitled to all the furniture and personal
59. No. 171, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1978).
60. See Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64, 67 (Ct. App. 1983).
61. No. 171, slip op., 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1978).
62. Ohio's no-fault divorce statute, Owo REv. Corse AsN. § 3105.01 (K) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984) was enacted
in 1974.
63. See the appeals court decision in Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64, 67 (Ct. App. 1983).
64. Id. at 65.
65. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 100, 464 N.E.2d 500, 502 (1984).
66. Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64, 65 (Ct. App. 1983).
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property other than her husband's purely personal property; (4) that the husband
would create, by will or trust, a trust for the wife with a principal of the lesser of
$200,000 or twenty percent of the husband's net estate. 67 The agreement also
provided that the husband would not pay for the wife's attorney's fees or costs for a
divorce. 68
B. The Appellate Court Decision
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the trial court's holding,
stating that the trial court erred in validating the divorce provisions in the agreement
and including them in the divorce decree. 69 The court of appeals believed that the trial
court should not have followed Benza, but rather should have applied the Ohio
Supreme Court's rule established in Burkhart and followed in Dearbaugh and
Kennedy.70 Because the wife was granted a divorce due to the husband's extreme
cruelty in Gross, the court of appeals held that the husband could not enforce the
antenuptial agreement. 7 1
Judge Moyer concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the majority's
reasoning. 72 He stated that the Ohio Supreme Court should re-examine the broad rule
it pronounced in Burkhart because of the rule's inflexibility and all-encompassing
nature.73 He felt that reconsideration was particularly important because the Ohio
Supreme Court had not examined the issue since 1947. 74
Judge Moyer also stated that, at a minimum, the Ohio Supreme Court should
hold that an antenuptial agreement should bind the parties if the court determines that
the agreement did not encourage the divorce. 75 He believed that the testimony
showed that the Grosses' agreement promoted, rather than discouraged, their
thirteen-year marriage because the husband would not have married without the
agreement. 76 He also believed that the Grosses' agreement was conscionable because
at the agreement's formation each spouse was represented by an attorney (Mrs.
Gross' attorney had advised her not to sign the agreement) 77 and a complete list of
each party's assets was attached to the agreement. 78
C. The Ohio Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court did reexamine the Burkhart rule in Gross
and reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the husband's marital
67. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 101, 464 N.E.2d 500, 503 (1984).
68. Id.
69. Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64, 67-68 (Ct. App. 1983).
70. Id. at 67.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 70 (Moyer, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 69.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 70.
77. Id. at 69.
78. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 101, 464 N.E.2d 500, 503 (1984).
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misconduct did not affect the enforceability of the agreement. 79 The court suggested
that the mutual promises of the spouses, rather than the marriage, are the
consideration for a prenuptial agreement.80 The court replaced the old law with a
three-part test of disclosure, nonpromotion of divorce, and lack of fraud, duress,
coercion, or overreaching. 81 The court also approved the Benza rationale by stating
that "the intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the agreement is also of
prime importance.'"82
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the property division allocation in Gross after
applying the three-part test.8 3 Although the support provisions were also valid
according to the three-part test, the court ordered increased support to the wife
because of "changed circumstances" which caused the provisions to be unconscio-
nable:84 the husband's wealth had substantially increased after the execution of the
agreement. The court believed that the underlying state interest in the wife's welfare
permitted the state to require that the wife's standard of living be maintained at this
new level.8 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S NEW RULES IN GROSS
A. Disclosure and Lack of Fraud, Duress, Coercion, and Overreaching
The Grosses' agreement passed the first two requirements of the Ohio Supreme
Court's three-part test which required a lack of "fraud, duress, coercion or
overreaching" in executing the agreement and "full disclosure, or full knowledge,
and understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse's
property. '86 The guidelines the court gave for applying these two requirements were
brief. The court stated that the elements of the first condition-lack of fraud, duress,
coercion, and overreaching-should be applied by using their generally accepted
meanings.8 7 The court further defined overreaching as "one party by artifice or
cunning, or by significant disparity to understand the nature of the transaction, to
79. Id. at 108, 464 N.E.2d at 508.
80. Id. at 107, 464 N.E.2d at 508.
81. Id. at 105, 464 N.E.2d at 506; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
82. Id. at 107, 464 N.E.2d at 508.
83. Id. at 108-09, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
84. Id. at 109, 111,464 N.E.2d at 509, 510. On remand for a more lucrative sustenance alimony determination
for Mrs. Gross, the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations awarded Mrs. Gross $2,500
per month in sustenance alimony. The common pleas court did not grant Mrs. Gross' $60,000 attorney fees, thus, the
court enforced the provision in the couple's antenuptial agreement which stated that on divorce Mr. Gross would not pay
for Mrs. Gross' attorney's fees. However, the court said that even if an antenuptial agreement disallowed attorney fees,
in the proper case attorney fees might be granted as part of the maintenance alimony where the dispute was solely about
the maintenance alimony. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed the common pleas court decision.
Judge Whiteside, however, stated in his separate opinion that the sustenance alimony awarded was unconscionable
considering: (1) that Mr. Gross' 1981 income was $359,887, (2) Mr. Gross' assets were worth approximately $8,000,000,
(3) Mrs. Gross had incurred legal fees of $60,000, and (4) the couple had enjoyed a high standard of living. Judge
Whiteside stated the minimum reasonable sustenance alimony to award in this case would have been $4,000 per month.
Gross v. Gross, No. 85AP-32, slip op. at 2758 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1985).
85. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 110, 464 N.E.2d 500, 510 (1984).
86. Id. at 105, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
87. Id.
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outwit or cheat the other.' '88 The court stated that the second requirement in the
three-part test, disclosure, "would be satisfied either by attaching a list of the parties'
assets to the agreement, or by showing that there had been a full disclosure by other
means. "89
Both disclosure (or lack of misrepresentation) and lack of fraud, duress,
coercion, and overreaching are basic and necessary contract requirements, especially
when applied to antenuptial agreements. In Gross the Ohio Supreme Court stated that
because the parties are facing an anticipated marriage when drafting the antenuptial
agreement, they are in a fiduciary relationship and they "must act in good faith, with
a high degree of fairness and disclosure of all circumstances which materially bear on
the antenuptial agreement. "90 Because of this trusting and confidential relationship,
there is an increased opportunity for coercion or overreaching by the stronger party.
Therefore, the need to determine that there was no fraud, coercion, or overreaching
and that there was a truthful disclosure of assets by both prospective spouses at the
execution of an antenuptial agreement is crucial.
Other courts and commentators have also declared that engaged couples are in
a fiduciary relationship requiring a high degree of good faith in executing a
contract. 9' The Florida Supreme Court in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio92 recognized
this relationship by stating, "[s]ince [parties to an antenuptial agreement] do not deal
at arm's length they must exercise a high degree of good faith and candor in all
matters bearing upon the contract.' 93 Professor Homer Clark, of the University of
Colorado Law School, has stated that there is an affirmative duty imposed upon each
prospective spouse to disclose his or her financial status and that this duty goes
beyond what is normally required for commercial contracts because of the confiden-
tial relationship involved. 94 Thus, the basic contract principles of full disclosure and
lack of overreaching are particularly necessary requirements for the formation of
antenuptial contracts executed by individuals in the trusting and confidential
engagement relationship.
These first two prongs of the Ohio Supreme Court's three-part test also enable
Ohio courts to focus on the procedural soundness of the antenuptial agreement at the
time of formation, rather than allowing the courts to make a substantive review of the
provisions. Lenore Weitzman, in her book The Marriage Contract, advocates a
procedural rather than substantive review of antenuptial agreements because a
substantive review allows judges to use their own discretion to determine what is best
for the parties. 95 Weitzman believes that because a procedural review precludes
judicial bias, it furthers the private ordering policy and allows couples to realize their
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 108, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
91. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982); Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla.
1962); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1950) (superseded by Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1977));
Clark, supra note 8, at 144; Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. Mimt L. REv. 692, 720 (1972).
92. 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (disclosure rule superseded by FLA. STAT. 732.702(2) (1983)).
93. Id. at 21.
94. See Clark, supra note 8, at 144.
95. See L. W r.,., supra note 3, at 353-59.
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expectation interests. 96 Use of the contract principles of disclosure and lack of fraud
and coercion to determine the validity of the antenuptial contract allows fair review
of agreements for conscionability and provides couples with the greatest amount of
drafting freedom.
Although the lack of fraud, coercion, duress, and overreaching requirements
allow a great deal of flexibility in drafting and are necessary to the formation of a
conscionable antenuptial contract, Ohio courts may have to develop new rules for
their application to antenuptial agreements. The Ohio Supreme Court in Gross did
define how the term "overreaching" is to be applied to antenuptial contracts.97
However, the court did not explain how the terms "fraud," "coercion," and
"duress" are to be applied to antenuptial contracts. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"fraud" as an intentional perversion of the truth to induce another to part with a
valuable legal right.98 "Duress" is defined as illegal imprisonment or threat of harm
used to induce another to act contrary to his free will,99 and "coercion" is similarly
defined as "compelling by force or arms or threat." 1oo
Although they have general definitions, these terms usually have been applied
only to commercial contracts. Professor Clark's discussion of greater disclosure and
good faith requirements in antenuptial contracts as compared to commercial contracts
demonstrates the need for new definitions for commercial contract terms when
applied to antenuptial agreements. 101 Until these new rules are developed, drafters
and courts may face some confusion. Ohio courts should not return to outdated rules.
An Ohio court could easily interpret "coercion" or "overreaching" to mean that the
provisions for the economically dependent spouse must be "fair and reasonable," as
stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Juhasz.0 2 Such an interpretation could cause a
regression of the private ordering policy.
The Missouri case of Ferry v. Ferry10 3 presented an example of the difficulties
inherent in using commercially applied principles for the review of antenuptial
contracts.104 As in Gross, the Missouri appellate court in Ferry did not explain how
to apply commercial contract terms to antenuptial agreements. The Ferry court stated
that the standard of conscionability for an antenuptial agreement would be the same
conscionability standard used in commercial contract law. 0 5 One commentator has
pointed out that the commercial contract standard of conscionability in the Uniform
Commercial Code is "whether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
96. Id.
97. See supra text accompanying note 88.
98. Btacx's Lw Dicno.tY 594 (5th ed. 1979).
99. Id. at 452.
100. Id. at 234.
101. See supra text accompanying note 94.
102. Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938); see also supra text accompanying note
41.
103. 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
104. Note, Antenuptial Contracts Contingent upon Divorce Are Not Invalid Per Se, 46 Mo. L. Rav. 228 (1981).
105. 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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making of the contract. "106 This commentator correctly states that it is difficult to see
how a test of conscionability that uses concepts such as "commercial needs" and
"commercial background" is to be adapted to antenuptial agreements. 107 He asserts
that the Ferry court, by its own terms, did not apply this standard of conscion-
ability, 108 and that this lack of definition would only confuse drafters and couples
considering marriage. 0 9
The definition of disclosure given by the Ohio Supreme Court in Gross may also
cause Ohio courts difficulty when applied to certain fact situations. As long as the
parties have attached a complete and truthful list of their assets to the agreement at
the time of formation, the disclosure requirement, according to the Ohio Supreme
Court, will be fulfilled. 1 0 The court also stated that, in lieu of an attached list, a
showing that there had been a full disclosure by other means may be made"'
(however, because of the difficulty in ascertaining what other means of disclosure a
court may accept, commentators have advised that attaching a list of assets is best to
avoid later problems):12 Professor Homer Clark also suggests that each spouse
should be advised by his or her own lawyer, because reliance by an economically
dependent spouse upon the independent spouse's lawyer may cause unconscionability
problems.1 3
Professor Charles Gamble believes that because the courts have not applied the
disclosure requirement equally to both the spouses, the economically independent
spouse makes a greater showing of disclosure than the economically dependent
spouse. 114 He believes that the economically dependent spouse should have a duty to
inquire equal to that of the economically independent spouse's duty to disclose." 5 In
light of the increasing equivalence of wealth between the sexes, the equal imposition
of this duty may not be as objectionable in the future. In the meantime, Ohio courts
should apply this rule in like manner to both the economically dependent and
independent spouses.
As antenuptial agreements become more popular, Ohio courts will further define
the disclosure and lack of fraud, duress, and coercion requirements, thereby
eliminating the present ambiguity problem of applying these commercial contract
terms to antenuptial agreements. Generally, these requirements are well suited to
antenuptial agreements, because they allow private ordering with minimal interfer-
ence from the courts.
106. See Note, supra note 104, at 234 (emphasis omitted). See also U.C.C. § 2-302, Official Comment (1978).
107. See Note, supra note 104, at 235.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 237.
110. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984).
111. Id.
112. See Clark, supra note 8, at 146, and Note, supra note 104, at 238.
113. See Clark, supra note 8, at 146.
114. See Gamble, supra note 91, at 723-24.
115. Id. at 726.
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B. Promotion of Divorce
The third prong of the three-part test pronounced by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Gross is the family law requirement, espoused in many prior domestic cases, 1 6 that
the antenuptial agreement's provisions not "promote or encourage divorce or
profiteering by divorce."' 1 7 The court stated that one example of promotion of
divorce would be "where the parties enter into an antenuptial agreement which
provides a significant sum either by way of property settlement or alimony at the time
of a divorce, and after the lapse of an undue [sic] short period of time one of the
parties abandons the marriage or otherwise disregards the marriage vows."" 8
Because the court gave only this one example of a provision which would be
invalid because it encourages divorce, domestic relations courts are left to determine
other situations which may promote divorce. Whenever a couple divorces within a
short time after the marriage ceremony, a domestic relations court may now use its
discretion to find that because one party benefits from the agreement, the agreement
promotes divorce. The Kansas Supreme Court in Fincham v. Fincham"9 held that a
provision in an antenuptial agreement entitling the husband to pay the wife $2000 in
complete settlement of every claim the wife might have against him was invalid
because it promoted divorce. 20 The court theorized that the husband would have
realized that he could end the marriage at the cost of only $2000.121 Under Gross, an
Ohio domestic relations court could also find that such a provision may be a
contributing cause to a divorce, because the court has great discretion in interpreting
the phrase "promoting or encouraging divorce or profiteering from divorce."
Professor Gamble agrees that drafters and prospective spouses face a difficult
task if it is necessary to write provisions that a court could not interpret as promoting
divorce:
It would be an insurmountable challenge to draft an antenuptial contract settling property
rights in such terms that it would not be profitable, in a pecuniary sense, for one spouse or
the other to seek a divorce. Practically every conceivable antenuptial contract looking
toward financial settlement would, in this sense, encourage divorce.'-
According to Gamble, the only way that a prospective couple can meet the test
of nonpromotion of divorce is to "strike upon some mysterious formula''123 that
would divide the couple's property as the divorce court would ultimately divide it. At
a minimum, under this rule, the provisions must be agreeable to the divorce court.
Requiring court approval of the provisions undercuts the private ordering benefit of
antenuptial agreements and destroys the parties expectation interests as well.
116. See, e.g., Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 688, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (1946); Appleby v. Appleby, 100
Minn. 408, 426, 111 N.W. 305, 310 (1907); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 127-28, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1930);
Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. App. 1964).
117. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984).
118. Id.
119. 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946), modified, 161 Kan. 753, 173 P.2d 244 (1946).
120. Id. at 688, 165 P.2d at 213.
121. Id.
122. See Gamble, supra note 91, at 712.
123. Id.
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Some state supreme courts have recognized that terms such as "promoting
divorce" or "encouraging divorce" are too indefinite. Therefore, these courts have
declared that only in specified situations will an antenuptial agreement be invalidated
for promotion of divorce. Nineteen years after Fincham, the Kansas Supreme Court
stated in In re Estate of Cooper'24 that Kansas courts should void provisions in an
antenuptial agreement only when the provisions either obligated one spouse not to
defend or contest a divorce suit by the other spouse, or obligated one spouse to sue
for or procure a divorce.12 5 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in Allen v. Allen126
specified that those divorce agreements which are illegal as contrary to public policy
are only those which have the effect of "withdrawing opposition to the divorce or not
to contest it or to conceal the true cause thereof by alleging another." ' 127 These
agreements "have no reference to bona fide agreements relating to alimony or the
adjustment of property rights between husband and wife, though in contemplation of
divorce, if they are not directly conducive to the procurement of it."'128
Kansas and Florida require something more than just clauses providing for
property division before their courts will determine that the agreement promotes
divorce. As Judge Moyer pointed out in his concurrence in the Ohio court of appeals'
decision in Gross, 2 9 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[a] promise
that merely disposes of property rights in the event of divorce or separation does not
of itself tend unreasonably to encourage either."' 30
The Kansas and Florida Supreme Courts in Cooper and Allen have more
narrowly defined what they considered to be "promoting divorce." At a minimum,
the Ohio Supreme Court should also define the nonpromotion of divorce requirement
more narrowly, rather than giving only one possible situation in which the phrase
"promoting divorce" is construed.
One of the most far-reaching cases to decide whether antenuptial agreements
promote divorce was the 1976 California Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage
of Dawley.131 In Dawley an unmarried teacher who became pregnant asked the father
of the unborn child to marry her-temporarily-because the woman feared that she
would lose her job if she gave birth as an unwed mother.132 The couple drafted an
antenuptial agreement in which the father agreed to support her for fourteen months
while she took a leave of absence, and he agreed to support the child until age
twenty-one. In addition, the agreement stated that each spouse disclaimed all rights,
including the community property rights, of the other, and that earnings acquired
during the marriage would be kept separate.' 33 As it happened, the couple stayed
together not fourteen months but eight years. When they finally did divorce, the wife
124. 195 Kan. 174, 403 P.2d 984 (1965).
125. Id. at 180, 403 P.2d at 988-89.
126. 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933).
127. Id. at 735, 150 So. at 238.
128. Id. at 735-36, 150 So. at 238.
129. Gross v. Gross, 4 Ohio Bar 64, 68 (1983) (Moyer, J., concurring).
130. RmSATrEmEr (SECOND) OF Com-.Acrs § 190(2)(c) (1979).
131. 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
132. Id. at 346-47, 551 P.2d at 325-26, 131 Cal. Rpr. at 6.
133. Id. at 347-48, 551 P.2d at 327, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
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challenged the agreement, claiming that it violated public policy since it did not
contemplate a marriage until death. 134 The California Supreme Court, however,
upheld the validity of the agreement, although the court candidly acknowledged that
it was made in contemplation of divorce.1 35 The court rejected past dictum that
antenuptial agreements "must be made in contemplation that the marriage relation
will continue until the parties are separated by death." ' 136 The court said that the new
test was whether the language of the contract objectively promoted dissolution of the
marriage. 137 The California Supreme Court also said that it would not use a subjective
test because "under a test based upon the subjective contemplation of the parties,
neither persons dealing with the parties nor even the parties themselves could rely on
the terms of the antenuptial agreement.' 138 Addressing the public policy consider-
ations the court said: "Neither the reordering of property rights to fit the needs and
desires of the couple, nor realistic planning that takes account of the possibility of
dissolution, offends the public policy favoring and protecting marriage." 139
Some states have decided to eliminate entirely the requirement that an
antenuptial contract must not promote divorce to be enforceable. 14° The Supreme
Court of Oregon in Unander v. Unander141 stated that it now doubted the validity of
its previous assumption that such agreements encourage divorce.1 42 In reversing the
prior law, the court in Unander relied upon Oregon's present policy that marriage
between spouses who "'cannot get along' is not worth preserving. ' ' 143 This policy,
the court said had been demonstrated by Oregon's adoption of a no-fault divorce
statute. 144 The court stated further that it believed that "a marriage preserved only
because good behavior by [one spouse] is enforced by the threat of having to pay
alimony is also not worth preserving." 145
Commentators agree with the Unander court's reasoning that the widespread
enactment by the states of no-fault divorce statutes indicates that society no longer has
any objection to the termination of a marriage which the spouses themselves wish to
end; therefore, the "nonpromotion of divorce" requirement is no longer valid.146
Professor Clark has concluded that an antenuptial agreement "can hardly be more
conducive to divorce than the [no-fault] divorce grounds themselves."' 147
Other policy reasons also mandate the elimination of the requirement that an
antenuptial agreement not promote divorce. The Ohio Supreme Court admitted in
Gross that "it may be reasonably concluded that these types of agreements tend to
134. Id. at 349, 551 P.2d at 327-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
135. Id. at 358, 551 P.2d at 333-34, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
136. In re Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 485, 516 P.2d 289, 295, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1973).
137. See In re Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9 (1976).
138. Id. at 352, 551 P.2d at 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
139. Id. at 358, 551 P.2d at 333, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
140. Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla. 1960); see infra text accompanying note 141.
141. 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
142. Id. at 105, 506 P.2d at 720.
143. Id. at 105, 506 P.2d at 721.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Clark, supra note 8, at 149; and Moore, supra note 8, at 13-14.
147. See Clark, supra note 8, at 149.
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promote or facilitate marriage, rather than encourage divorce,"' 48 a proposition
approved by various courts and commentators.149 As discussed, antenuptial agree-
ments typically are made by older couples with substantial assets, to preserve those
assets for children of a prior marriage. 150 Refusal to enforce these agreements may
have the perverse effect of deterring a person with substantial assets from getting
married. Moreover, once the couple is married, an antenuptial agreement may also
promote marital stability by defining expectations and responsibilities.' 5 ' Similarly,
such agreements can reduce the hostility and destructiveness of a divorce, should one
occur.' 52 In addition, no empirical evidence supports the contention that giving legal
recognition to premarital contracts with provisions for divorce has any effect on the
probability of divorce.153
By requiring that a prenuptial contract not "promote or encourage divorce or
profiteering by divorce," the traditional family law standard, the Ohio Supreme
Court is perpetuating an outdated principle and is out of step with modern policy. The
Ohio Supreme Court admitted in Gross that a major reason in the past for invalidating
these agreements was that "provisions in such contracts which provide for one spouse
to forfeit marital property or conjugal rights are potentially profitable to the other
party, would encourage divorce and, therefore, would be contrary to the state's
interest in preserving the marriage."154 The court then recognized that many changes
have taken place in the last fifteen years in society's attitudes towards marriage.' 55
Yet, after stating the past reasons for invalidating these agreements and recognizing
that attitudes have changed, the court preserved this outdated family law requirement
in its nonpromotion of divorce test.
In view of society's present attitudes on marriage, the problems involved in
trying to draft the perfect agreement that does not, in the court's opinion, promote
divorce, and the policy that the parties' expectation interest not be destroyed, the
Ohio Supreme Court should have eliminated the requirement that an antenuptial
agreement must not promote divorce. At a minimum, the court should have listed, in
a general manner, situations in which an agreement would be determined to promote
divorce or profiteering from divorce. Other states have listed such situations to aid
drafters, to inform prospective couples, and to help domestic relations courts interpret
antenuptial agreements.
148. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984).
149. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728,732 (Colo. 1982); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970);
Clark, supra note 8, at 142; Moore, supra note 8, at 13.
150. See supra text accompanying note 8.
151. See Clark, supra note 8, at 149.
152. Id.
153. Volid v. Volid, 6 I11. App. 3d 386, 391, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1972); Moore, supra note 8, at 13.
154. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 104, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (1984).
155. Id.
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C. Change in Circumstances
1. Ohio's Changed Circumstance Test
After the three-part test-lack of fraud, duress, coercion, and overreaching;
disclosure; and nonpromotion of divorce-has been met, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Gross stated that an antenuptial agreement will generally be held valid.156 Although
property division provisions can then be enforced because they will be considered fair
at the time the document is executed, 157 the court stated that sustenance alimony
provisions must meet the additional test of being conscionable at the time of
divorce. 158 The court did not define "conscionability;" the court asserted that the
family law concept of "changed circumstances" constituted unconscionability.l 5 9 In
determining whether changed circumstances have made support provisions uncon-
scionable at divorce, the reviewing-court should apply the factors found in Ohio
Revised Code section 3105.18,160 (regulating alimony). A footnote to the Gross
opinion reiterated several factors listed in Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18 which
may constitute changed circumstances resulting in a finding that the agreement was
unconscionable at the time of divorce. 161 These factors included an extreme health
problem, change in employability of a spouse, responsibility for the children of the
marriage at divorce, and an increased standard of living during the marriage. 162
Using this "changed circumstances" test, the Ohio Supreme Court found that
the Grosses' agreement did contain unconscionable sustenance alimony provi-
sions. 163 The court believed that because Mr. Gross' assets and net income had
increased substantially since the marriage, his wife's standard of living had increased
considerably since the execution of the agreement. This was a sufficient change in
circumstances to render the alimony provisions unconscionable, because to require
"the wife to return from this opulent standard of living" to the living standard which
would be required within the limitations of the support provisions would "occasion
a hardship or be significantly difficult for the former wife." 164
2. The "Needs" Test
In formulating the "changed circumstances" standard for modifying sustenance
alimony provisions, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on the Colorado Supreme Court's
pronouncement of the standard in Newman v. Newman. 65 However, the Ohio
Supreme Court misinterpreted the Colorado Supreme Court's use of the "changed
circumstances" standard. The Ohio Supreme Court correctly stated that Newman
156. Id. at 105, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
157. Id. at 109, 464 N.E.2d at 509.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 109-10, 464 N.E.2d at 509-10. See also Owo REv. CODF ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
161.' 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 109 n.ll, 464 N.E.2d 500, 509 n.ll (1984).
162. Id. at 110 n. 12, 464 N.E.2d at 510 n. 12. See Oao REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18(B) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
163. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 111, 464 N.E.2d 500, 510 (1984).
164. Id. at 110, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
165. 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982).
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held that the changed circumstances of the parties may be a reason for the trial court
to amend a sustenance alimony provision.1 66 However, it ignored the Colorado
Supreme Court's limitation of its "changed circumstances" test to whether the
dependent spouse could no longer support himself or herself under the provisions of
the contract: "In our view, unconscionability ... as applied to a maintenance
agreement exists when enforcement of the terms of the agreement results in a spouse
having insufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs and who is otherwise
unable to support himself through appropriate employment."'' 67
The approach in Newman can be characterized as a "needs" test for determining
whether sustenance alimony provisions in an antenuptial contract should be modified.
Unlike the Ohio Supreme Court in Gross, the Colorado Supreme Court would not
modify a spousal support provision merely because of a change in living standards
after marriage.
Other states have also limited modification of sustenance alimony provisions to
circumstances when a spouse cannot reasonably support himself or herself on the
alimony granted by the provisions. In discussing the modification of a sustenance
alimony provision, the Oregon Supreme Court in Unander v. Unander168 stated:
"We have now come to the conclusion that antenuptial agreements concerning
alimony should be enforced unless enforcement deprives the spouse of support that
he or she cannot otherwise secure." 169 Thus, according to the Oregon and Colorado
Supreme Courts, when the dependent spouse has another reasonable means of
support, even a provision providing for no alimony may not be modified.' 70
Professor Clark agrees with these courts. He states that "the law now seems to
be developing in the direction of permitting spouses, by means of an antenuptial
agreement, to control their obligations for alimony or maintenance on divorce or
separation, provided the agreement ... makes adequate provision for each spouse in
view of the needs and resources of each." 1 7'
This "needs" test promoted by Clark and used by Oregon and Colorado to
decide when a sustenance alimony provision should be modified also most effectively
preserves the other modem policy reasons for enforcing antenuptial agreements
providing for divorce. As discussed above, Ohio and other states have validated these
agreements because attitudes about marriage have changed. Divorce and remarriage
have increased, and courts have agreed that these contracts promote second marriages
because they allow the parties to enter the marriage confident that their assets will be
preserved in case of divorce.1 72 An Illinois court of appeals, when evaluating an
antenuptial contract in Volid v. Volid,173 stressed the importance of this private
166. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 105, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1984).
167. 653 P.2d 728, 735 (Colo. 1982).
168. 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
169. Id. at 107, 506 P.2d at 721.
170. Some courts have already validated antenuptial agreements providing for no sustenance alimony for the
dependent spouse upon divorce. See Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 89-90, 320 N.E.2d 506, 511 (1974); Hudson v.
Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Okla. 1960).
171. See Clark, supra note 8, at 150-51 (emphasis added).
172. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731 (Colo. 1982); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970).
173. 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
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ordering by stating that persons contemplating marriage should be given the right to
waive marital rights or limit them by contract without being prevented from doing so
by the courts. 174 In Unander the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that a large number
of citizens need to "be able to freely enter into antenuptial agreements in the
knowledge that their bargain is inviolate as any other."' 175
United States Supreme Court decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut'76 and
Orr v. Orr177 have also promoted private ordering of the marital relationship. 178 The
needs test promotes the policies of private ordering, preserving the expectation
interests of the parties and thereby promoting marriages that might not otherwise
occur, because it allows most alimony provisions to be enforced. Under the needs
test, any alimony provision will be enforced as long as both spouses are otherwise
self-sufficient at divorce and the agreement was conscionable at the time it was
written. The needs test assures propsective spouses that in the event of divorce, they
will retain the property they expected to retain, thus removing a disincentive to
marry.
The needs test also promotes other major policy considerations. It satisfies the
state's responsibility for making certain that its dependent divorced citizens receive
needed support and relieves the state of its burden of providing for that support. It
also allows antenuptial agreements containing divorce provisions to be treated
similarly to antenuptial agreements containing provisions for the division of property
and support at death, because courts have long enforced disproportionate property
and support provisions in the latter type of agreement. 179
3. Critique of Ohio's Changed Circumstances Test
a. Ohio Revised Code Section 3105.18
The Ohio Supreme Court in Gross stated that a spouse's need would be one
factor used to determine whether changed circumstances, which mandate the
modification of an alimony provision, have occurred.1 80 However, the court added a
burdensome and unnecessary requirement to its test by allowing Ohio courts to
consider the other factors in Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18 (Ohio's alimony
statute) to determine whether circumstances have changed at divorce. Factors such as
standard of living changes burden the changed circumstances review with require-
ments that undercut the modem policy reasons for antenuptial contracts. Putting these
additional restrictions on maintenance alimony provisions discourages private order-
174. Id. at 392, 286 N.E.2d at 47.
175. Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 108, 506 P.2d 719, 722 (1973).
176. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state has limited control over the type of birth control used by spouses).
177. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (husband and wife may have an equal duty of support).
178. Professor Gamble states that "the common denominator of concern in formulating any rule is to insure that
these antenuptial agreements will not shift the burden of supporting the prospective spouse upon the state through its
welfare department." Gamble, supra note 91, at 729.
179. Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 236, 238, 431 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (1982); Troha v. Sneller, 169 Ohio
St. 397, 402, 159 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1959); Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264-65, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938).
180. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 109 n.ll, 464 N.E.2d 500, 509 n.ll (1984).
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ing, because prospective spouses will not bother drafting agreements which are likely
to be modified by the court at the time of divorce. Couples may also be more reluctant
to enter marriage if they cannot be assured of preserving their assets.
The change in standard of living factor is a particularly bad test to use to
determine the conscionability of sustenance alimony provisions. Whenever persons of
dissimilar economic status marry, which is the typical situation when an antenuptial
agreement is drafted, one spouse's standard of living will change. The reason the
wealthier spouse drafts a prenuptial agreement is to keep the poorer spouse from
receiving assets at divorce. Justice James Celebrezze, in a separate opinion in Gross,
stated that the standard of living test for sustenance alimony is also flawed by illogic,
because a spouse who saves little and spends recklessly will be allowed to continue
an opulent standard of living, while a frugal spouse might be deprived of any claim
to savings. 181
b. Antenuptial Agreements Compared with Separation Agreements and Judicial
Divorce Decrees
Another flaw in the Ohio Supreme Court's use of the factors listed in the Ohio
alimony statute to determine the enforceability of sustenance alimony provisions in
antenuptial agreements was that the purposes and policies supporting antenuptial
agreements are very different than those underlying judicial divorce decrees or
separation agreements at divorce. The Colorado Supreme Court in Newman recog-
nized this difference and formulated a different test, the "needs" test, for the
modification of support provisions in antenuptial agreements, rather than using the
statutory test for the modification of support provisions in separation agreements:
[T]here are valid reasons for distinguishing between the review for unconscionability
prescribed by the statute for separation agreements, . . . and the review of the antenuptial
agreements which focus on the property the parties bring into the marriage, and which
establish the parties' expectation of financial benefits to be obtained by virtue of the
marriage.182
According to the Newman court, parties to an antenuptial agreement are
concerned with removing as much uncertainty as possible from the potential division
of property at the death of one party or at the dissolution of their planned marriage. 3
The court clarified the difference between this planning purpose of antenuptial
agreements and the purpose of separation agreements at divorce by stating:
[T]here is an assumption in the law that the parties are essentially able to act independently
and rationally concerning their present and future property interests in relation to their
prospective marriage.... Separation agreements, on the other hand, are designed to enable
divorcing parties to reach an amicable out-of-court settlement of their claims to the property
of the other as affected by the marriage relationship and the circumstances then existing. ' a
181. Id. at 113, 464 N.E.2d at 512 (Celebrezze, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 733 (Colo. 1982).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Thus, the purpose of the parties entering into an antenuptial agreement is to form
a contract in which exchanged promises are the consideration. There is no
consideration, however, involved in a divorce decree or separation agreement
incorporated into a divorce decree, because the decree is an order of the court.
Separation agreements may be reviewed by a court with contract jurisdiction, but
contract principles, rather than Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18, will be used to
determine the agreement's enforceability.
Policy reasons, as well as purposes, also differ for antenuptial agreements and
for separation agreements or divorce decrees granting alimony. An antenuptial
agreement is a privately ordered contract distributing property rights before marriage
and is used to encourage a marriage that might not otherwise occur. It therefore
provides for marital stability by defining expectations and responsibilities. By
contrast, at the formation of a separation agreement or judicial divorce decree, the
spousal separation has already occurred, and the promotion of a stable marriage
relationship is no longer a factor.
Because of the fundamental differences in policy and purpose between
antenuptial contracts and separation agreements or divorce decrees, family courts'
review of these instruments should be different. Ohio courts should develop a
separate formula for reviewing the modification of alimony provisions in antenuptial
agreements, instead of using Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18, which was
developed with the policies and purposes of alimony judicially decreed at divorce in
mind.
c. Judicial Discretion
Most importantly, Ohio's "changed circumstances" test, which is to be applied
by using the factors in Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18, gives Ohio courts too
much discretion in deciding when to modify sustenance alimony provisions. Ohio
courts have eleven factors (at least; these factors are not exclusive) in section 3105.18
to choose from in justifying their reason for the modification of sustenance alimony
provisions. Some of these factors, such as the change in living standard during the
marriage, are very subjective.
One commentator, discussing Michigan's change of circumstances test, stated
that "unless a change of circumstances is more narrowly defined, any court might be
justified in setting aside a marital agreement which conflicts with the way the court
itself would have distributed the property." 1 85 According to this commentator, mere
passage of time might be considered a change of circumstances which might induce
some judges to impose their view of fairness upon the parties, notwithstanding the
parties' prior written agreement.186
Lenore Weitzman, in The Marriage Contract agrees that the changed circum-
stances standard is "a subjective standard in that it is based on the judge's subjective
assessment of fairness. It is also subjective in that it is likely to vary from judge to
185. Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L. PMa;oRM 397, 410 (1977).
186. Id.
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judge ... a review for fairness inevitably allows a judge more discretion." '1 87 A
study on Ohio domestic decisions has shown that domestic judges, left to their own
discretion, produce a wide variety of sustenance alimony orders when given the same
factual case.1 88 Weitzman advocates that the courts use pure procedural contract
standards to review alimony provisions in prenuptial agreements.1 89 She believes this
will best promote private ordering and marriage, because couples will know that their
original agreement will not be changed if the procedural formalities, such as lack of
fraud, duress, and coercion, are met. 190
Although the sterile review advocated by Weitzman would promote private
ordering and preserve the couple's expectation interests, the review of an antenuptial
agreement requires a more stringent test because of the state's responsibility for the
welfare of the divorced dependent spouse. Even though the "nonpromotion of
divorce" standard is outdated, the policy that a state has a responsibility for the
welfare of its divorced dependent citizens should continue. The state would have to
provide for these dependents if they were not otherwise supplied with the necessities
of life. A pure procedural review of sustenance alimony provisions would not
determine whether these provisions would give an economically dependent spouse
the necessities of life after the divorce, because the needs of the dependent spouse
would never be reviewed. A pure procedural review of spousal support provisions in
a prenuptial contract therefore is inappropriate.
4. Summary of the "Needs" Test
The "needs" test provides the best standard of review because it fulfills the
state's responsibility for making certain dependent spouses' needs are provided
without welfare assistance, yet it allows only minimal or no judicial discretion. Using
the "needs" standard of review is more objective than using the eleven factors in
Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18, because the court must focus on only one factor:
whether the alimony provisions or the dependent spouse's own resources will provide
this spouse with the necessities of life. The couple's standard of living need never be
considered. Under this test, the court should only consider whether the alimony
provisions or the dependent party's resources will provide him or her with the
necessities of life-food, clothing, and shelter. The judge should only review the
alimony provisions and the dependent spouse's circumstances to determine if these
needs are met.
For some, a review for needs alone may seem too dispassionate. However, this
review would be made only after the alimony provisions had already passed the
three-part Gross test.' 9' The dependent spouse will have entered into the agreement
187. See L. WEanmmN, supra note 3, at 354.
188. Milligan, Guidelines in Alimony & Support for Ohio, 52 OHIo ST. B.A. REP. 2009, 2025 (1979). This article
documents the results of a study on judicial awards granted in a hypothetical divorce case. In the hypothetical case, Ohio
domestic judges awarded sustenance alimony to the wife ranging from zero to $17,600.
189. See L. WVurzstN, supra note 3, at 359.
190. Id.
191. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99. 105, 464 N.E.2d 500. 506 (1984).
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without fraud, duress, or coercion, of the spouse's own free will, after a complete
disclosure of assets has been made, and after being advised by a lawyer. Many
antenuptial agreements dividing property at death that provided grossly inadequate
support for the surviving spouse have been upheld under the same circumstances.192
Under the "needs" test, couples may also use their freedom to contract to provide for
changed circumstances, such as a change in standard of living or inflation, by adding
a clause to that effect in the agreement. The "needs" test would only be used to
determine spousal support payments. Courts may still consider a family's standard of
living and the best interests of children to determine child support payments.19 3
Because the "needs" test promotes freedom of contract, satisfies the state's
burden to support dependent citizens, and restricts judicial discretion, it is better
suited for the review of alimony provisions in antenuptial contracts than Ohio's
"changed circumstances" test or procedural review. In essence, by stating that the
"changed circumstances" standard is to be used to review a sustenance alimony
provision, the Ohio Supreme Court is saying that this type of provision is invalid,
because a domestic judge is left free to make any alimony allowance he or she
chooses as long as the decision can be supported by one of the eleven factors in the
alimony statute-a simple task.
D. Sustenance Alimony and Property Division
The Ohio Supreme Court's different treatment of sustenance alimony provisions
and property provisions in antenuptial contracts is also improper because of the
difficulty inherent in differentiating between the two. In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 194 an
important Ohio case discussing the modification of property and alimony provisions,
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized this dilemma, stating that "[c]ourts have long
recognized that the monetary provision made for wives at divorce casts a mixed hue
of 'alimony' and a division of property."' 195 The court in Wolfe further confused this
identification by stating that alimony could be given "either in real or personal
property, or both, or in money, payable in gross or in installments."' 96
Perhaps because of this difficulty, the Ohio General Assembly chose to enact
just one statute, Ohio Revised Code section 3105.18,197 to guide judicial decrees for
both sustenance alimony and property division at divorce. The inclusion of review for
property division and sustenance alimony under one statute may demonstrate the
legislature's conclusion that at divorce property division and sustenance alimony
serve the same purpose.
Professors Gamble and Clark agree that because distinguishing between property
division and sustenance alimony provisions is so difficult, the two should be treated
192. Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 236, 238, 431 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (1982); Troha v. Sneller, 169 Ohio
St. 397, 402, 159 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1959); Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264-65, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938).
193. See Ofio REv. CoDE ANN. § 3109.05 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
194. 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976), overruled, Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 421 N.E.2d
1293 (1981).
195. Id. at 411, 350 N.E.2d at 421-22.
196. Id. at 412, 350 N.E.2d at 422.
197. See Oino REv. Cone ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984).
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similarly. Clark believes that the two should "share the same fate," because property
division often performs essentially the same function as alimony. 198 Gamble
maintains that antenuptial agreements especially lend themselves to the lack of
differentiation in judicial treatment that is accorded alimony and property settlement
provisions.1 99 The provisions stipulating alimony and property division are so
interconnected that it is usually simpler to void the entire agreement, if one provision
is determined to be unconscionable, than it is to recognize any distinction between the
provisions. 200 Magnifying the problem, he states, is the fact that antenuptial contracts
consisting solely of property division provisions are rare. 20 ' As an example of how
interconnected sustenance alimony provisions and property provisons can be in
antenuptial contracts, Gamble says that such contracts often state that upon divorce,
the wife will receive a set payment which includes both an alimony settlement and a
property settlement. 202 Professors Gamble and Clark therefore agree that separating
sustenance alimony and property division provisions and determining their legal
effect is obviously difficult.
Justice Celebrezze also expressed the impropriety of the different treatment of
support provisions and property division provisions in his separate opinion in the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Gross.20 3 Justice Celebrezze cited Ranney v.
Ranney,204 in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that an agreement which waives
any claim of a spouse to property acquired during the marriage, regardless of that
spouse's contribution, may be unconscionable. 20 5 Justice Celebrezze concluded that
the majority's rule in Gross may be sexist in that it does not look at the possibility that
the wife may have contributed to the acquisition of marital property through work
outside the home or by being a homemaker. 20 6
Providing a conscionability test for property division provisions as well as for
sustenance alimony provisions would provide a means to regulate the problem
discussed by Justice Celebrezze, at least enough to ensure that dependent spouses will
not typically be relegated to the rolls of welfare recipients at divorce. A conscion-
ability test for both types of provisions will also eliminate the virtually impossible
task of classifying provisions which are really one and the same.
The "needs" standard is the appropriate standard for conscionability review of
both types of clauses, because the purposes and policy reasons for these provisions
in antenuptial contracts are the same. By validating both types of provisions, the state
is promoting private ordering and marriage. By providing for a "needs" conscion-
ability review, the state will be assuring that divorced dependent spouses are provided
with the necessities of life. The "needs" test may not totally eradicate the problem
198. See Clark, supra note 8, at 153.
199. See Gamble, supra note 91, at 709.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 111, 464 N.E.2d 500, 511 (1984) (Celebrezze, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
204. 219 Kan. 428, 548 P.2d 734 (1976).
205. Id. at 432-33, 548 P.2d at 738.
206. 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 113,464 N.E.2d 500,512 (1984) (Celebrezze, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of the dependent spouse's contribution to the marital assets as discussed by Justice
Celebrezze, 20 7 but it will assure that a dependent spouse's needs are met from the
proceeds or use of marital property or through support payments.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of recent social changes, the antenuptial agreement is being used more
frequently and is likely to take on new functions. Young people are waiting until a
later age, when they have greater assets, to enter their first marriages.2 08 Therefore,
the antenuptial agreement may begin to be used more frequently by parties entering
first marriages. Older, previously married parties, among whom antenuptial contracts
were already common, will also continue increasingly to use these agreements
because of decisions such as Gross. National trends indicate that private ordering is
becoming more socially acceptable, because people want more control over their own
personal lives with minimum government interference.2 09 Through Gross, Ohio has
taken the first step towards allowing private ordering of the marital relationship.
Although Ohio's first step is commendable, that step needs to be perfected.
Merging past family law principles with modem contract law concepts is a difficult
task, because of their polarity. In blending these concepts, the purposes and policies
underlying modem antenuptial contracts must be preserved. Outdated family law
concepts, such as "nonpromotion of divorce" or requiring the economically
dependent spouse to maintain the dependent spouse's marital lifestyle, must be
eliminated. Promoting private ordering should be maximized while assuring that
Ohio's divorced dependent spouses receive necessary support. Reviewing procedural
conscionability at the time of contract formation by using disclosure and lack of fraud
or overreaching standards, but making certain that dependent spouses will receive the
necessities of life after divorce, completely fulfills these modem purposes and
policies for antenuptial agreements created to divide property and provide sustenance
alimony at divorce.
Michelle Dorsey Deis
207. Id.
203. In 1969, 72% of the brides and 58% of the grooms that year were under 25 years old. This rate steadily
decreased from 1969 to 1979. In 1979, only 60% of the brides and 45% of the grooms were under 25 years old. VrrAL
STAT ncS OF Tm UIrE STASEs 1979, Vol. IlI-MsRmcp Ao DIVoRcE, Table 1-16, p. 1-16 (1984); VfrAL STATLScs OF THE
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